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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the District 
Court, excluding the defendant who settled out: 
1. Cameron Smith, Plaintiff, represented by counsel J. Paul Stockdale, both of Ogden, 
Utah. 
2. Bank of Utah, Inc., represented by their counsel RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON Salt Lake City, Utah (030906813 CV - District Court). 
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and BANK OF UTAH, Inc., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Priority No. 15 
Court of Appeals 
CaseNo.20050797-CA 
Second District 
Case No. 030906813 CV 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) and Utah Rule of App. P. Rules 3 and 4. Pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah 
Code Ann., the Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
i 
1. Whether as a matter of law the Bank of Utah owes a safety design and engineering 
duty to a bicyclist traversing a public sidewalk when it constructs an outdoor teller drive 
thru and diverts the drive thru traffic across the public sidewalk and back onto a public 
road. 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment presents only questions of law, we 
review the trial court's decision under a standard of correctness, according no deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions.11 Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 
788, 790 (Utah Ct App. 1998). "In evaluating whether the trial court was correct in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ruling there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and inferences in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party/1 Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. 
Wasatch County, 40P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah App. 2001). 
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Notice of Appeal (R. 370-372); 
Appellant's Docketing Statement. (R. 382-394) 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-19(1) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-1008 (2005) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-216 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-100 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-80.5 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-87.3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: this appeal is from the summary judgment of the 
Second District Court, Weber County, which entered a judgment as a matter of law that 
the Bank of Utah owed no duty to the Appellant herein and dismissed the suit. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW: 
1. Complaint was filed against Appellee on August 26,2003. 
2. Bank of Utah filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18, 2005 alleging that the 
Appellee owed no duty as a matter of law to the Appellant. 
3. Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on June 10, 2005. 
4. On August 4, 2005 the Court heard oral arguments then ruled from the bench in favor 
of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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4 
5. Subsequently the Court entered an order granting Appellee*s motion for summary 
judgment ruling that the Appellee owed no duty to the Appellant as a matter of law. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: 
The Appellant herein was riding his bicycle on a paved sidewalk in front of the Bank of 
I 
Utah next to a building that created a blind approach to the drive thru teller window 
patrons attempted to enter a public roadway. The patrons could not avoid physically 
entering the sidewalk with their vehicles to get a view of whether or not there was 
someone on the sidewalk. A car driven by a patron of the Appellee drove past the blind 
corner thru the sidewalk and collided with the Appellant. From this the Appellant 
suffered serious and irreparable injuries to his knee. 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
1. Appellant Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicyclist collision on or 
about March 31, 2003 at approximately 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. 
(R. 367) 4 
2. Tanisha Phitsnoukanh was exiting from a teller drive-thru owned by Appellee 
Bank of Utah, and failed to stop or slow down as she went across the sidewalk and struck 
I 
the Appellant on his bicycle. (R. 367) 
3. Phitsnoukanh had used the teller exit at least once a month over the course of a 
year before the March 31, 2003 collision. (R. 367) 
4. Phitsnoukanh testified that before the collision she knew there was a sidewalk 
running along Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would 
typically stop to look for pedestrians. (R. 367) 
3 
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5. Appellant Cameron Smith had rode a bicycle along the sidewalk where the 
collision occurred approximately three or four times prior to the March 31, 2003 
collision. (R. 368) 
6. As Appellant Cameron Smith approached the teller exit, he slowed his bicycle to 
gauge traffic and to watch for approaching vehicles. (R. 368) 
7. Appellant Cameron Smith testified that Phitsnoukanh was coming very quickly 
looking down and that she did not stop at the stop sign or the sidewalk. (R. 368) 
Trial Court's Conclusions of Law 
1. The determination of whether Appellee owes Appellant a duty of care is a 
question of law to be determined by the Court. (R. 368) 
2. Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield the right of way to Appellant 
Cameron Smith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 and §41-6-100. (R. 368) 
3. Appellant Cameron Smith had a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a 
reasonable speed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3. (R. 368) 
4. The legislature has not imposed a statutory duty on a landowner such as Appellee 
Bank of Utah to protect pedestrians/bicycles using a public sidewalk. (R. 368) 
5. Appellee Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect 
pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk. (R. 368) 
6. Appellee Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to Appellant Cameron Smith as 
a matter of law. (R. 368) 
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i 
1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to Appellee Bank of Utah's 
lack of duty to Appellant Cameron Smith in this case and therefore, Appellee Bank of 
Utah is entitled to summary judgment. (R. 369) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
The Appellee owes a duty when it undertakes to use its land in a manner that poses 
a danger to the public using a public right of way. Here, the Appellee built a drive thru 
window which it knew or should have known was going to be misused by its patrons in a 
way that made it dangerous for those traversing the sidewalk in front of the drive-thru in 
danger. 
I. ARGUMENT 
BANK OF UTAH HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO 
PROTECT PEDESTRIANS FROM HIGH TRAFFIC 
USAGE CAUSED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THEIR DRIVE THRU TELLER WINDOW 
i 
A, Marshalling the Evidence 
Requirement of marshalling evidence in support of an appeal applies only to 
challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law. See Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 
193 (Utah 2000). And because the Appellant is not challenging the findings of fact but is 
concerned only with the ruling as a matter of law, the marshalling of the evidence is not 
necessary under the circumstances. The Appellant is challenging the trial court's ignoring 
an expert opinion which basically said that but for the design of the Bank of Utah drive 
thru the Appellant would not have been injured. 
5 
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B. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is only proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). For purposes of such analysis, the 
Court must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f 10,48 
P.3d235. 
However, when negligence is alleged, as in this case before the Court, "summary 
judgment should be granted with great caution...." English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 
1156 (Utah 1989). As the Supreme Court further stated: 
4
 It is only when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law.' Accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for 
only the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
Id. (citations omitted.) 
Bank of Utah, as the landowner holding property upon which an artificial 
condition caused an injury to the Appellant, cannot sidestep its liability by claiming it 
owed no duty to warn Appellant of the danger to be encountered, or to otherwise take 
reasonable and simple measures to eliminate the risk of this type of accident from 
occurring. The Bank of Utah should owe Appellant a duty, as a matter of law when it 
created the artificial danger which brought both Appellant and Phitsnoukanh together. 
C Duty as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
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At least two separate sections of the Restatement provide for Appellee's liability. 
The first deals with artificial conditions upon land affecting travelers upon an adjacent 
public highway. The second, imposes a duty upon a landowner if the traveler will either 
not discover the danger, or, having discovered it, cannot be expected to reasonably avoid 
it Under either analysis, Bank of Utah owed Cameron a duty to protect him from exiting 
vehicles, which Bank of Utah failed to do. 
(a) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 
Utah follows the general rule with regards to duties of landowners to others: 
A landowner may use his property as he sees fit, subject, however, to 
having due regard for the safety of others who may be affected by it. 
The owner is under an obligation to make such reasonable use of his 
property that it will not cause unreasonable harm to others in the 
vicinity thereof. 
Schulz v. Quintana, 576 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1978). Many of the cases addressing such 
liability deal with a public highway or right-of-way adjacent to such land, like the case at 
bar. In those instances: 
Once a highway has been established there is an obligation upon the 
occupiers of abutting land to use ordinary care to see that the 
passage way is reasonably safe for travel. 
Id 
These requirements mirror the duty set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS, § 368, which reads: 
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an 
excavation or other artificial condition so near an existing highway 
that he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk 
to others accidentally brought into contact with such condition while 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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traveling with reasonable care upon the highway, is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who: 
(a) are traveling on the highway, or 
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel 
Bank of Utah's egress, with its dangerously limited field of vision to the south, 
and which does not allow for viewing pedestrians until after the vehicle has entered the 
sidewalk, is an artificial condition upon its own land, which abuts and crosses over the 
public sidewalk. Bank of Utah should know that the "blind corner" creates an 
unreasonable risk that pedestrians and others traveling on the sidewalk could be struck by 
an exiting vehicle. The limited field of view of the exiting driver also establishes that 
Bank of Utah cannot reasonably rely upon the ability of the driver to see pedestrians in 
order to discharge its duty. (R. 164, 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact Nos. 2, 3 and 7. 
See also pictures R.202 and 204.) Drivers are not able to see until they have begun to 
travel into and over the sidewalk area. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 8. R.202 
and 204.) This is especially true in light of the way that many patrons exit the Bank's 
facilities without slowing or stopping at the stop sign. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed 
Fact No. 6.) Accordingly, Bank of Utah owed Cameron a duty to use reasonable care to 
warn him of the potential harm. 
(b) Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 343 and 343A 
Bank of Utah may argue that under §§ 343 and 343 A, the Bank owed no duty to 
Appellant or any other travelers upon the sidewalk, because the danger posed by the 
obscured driveway was 'open and obvious.' First, then this should be a jury question. 
And second, under this analysis, Appellant has to show that Bank of Utah "(a) knows or 
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I 
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they % 
will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) 
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger." Hale v. Beckstead, 
I 
116P.3d 263, 266 (Utah 2005) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343). This 
is not the complete standard, however, as both 343 and 343A must be read together. Id. 
Importantly, § 343 A provides that "the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of 
public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that 
the harm should be anticipated." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A (2). 
It seems beyond argument that "[a] pedestrian has the right to assume that the 
sidewalk is in a reasonably safe condition, and to act upon that assumption." Salt Lake 
Citvv. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 272, 159 P.2d 149 (1945). The fact that the public is 
entitled to use this right-of-way across Appellee's land to traverse the city should also be 
noted. Because the sidewalk is open for the use of the general public, and because < 
travelers and pedestrians thereon have the right-of-way (see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
6a-1008 (2005)), the harm that occurred in this case - a driver unable to see approaching 
i 
travelers on the sidewalk entered the sidewalk from behind the obstruction and there 
struck the Appellant - should be anticipated. Additionally, the harm can be anticipated 
because so many drivers enter the sidewalk without slowing or attempting to see 
approaching travelers. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 6.) Accordingly, Bank 
of Utah should realize that pedestrians and other travelers on the sidewalk would assume 
safe passage, absent some sort of warning from the landowner. While Bank of Utah 
9 
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provides a stop sign for drivers exiting Bank of Utah's property, the Bank provides no 
warnings or protection for the passing traveler. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 
5.) 
As to the obviousness of the danger posed by Bank of Utah's exit, the facts of this 
particular case point out that even limited awareness of the potential danger is not enough 
to guard against the harm. For drivers exiting the bank, the ability to see approaching 
pedestrians is necessary before they can comply with their statutory duty to avoid 
colliding with pedestrians on the sidewalk. However, the obstruction of the driveway 
makes that impossible, without the drivers first entering into the area of the sidewalk. (R. 
165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 8.) Likewise, while pedestrians and other travelers 
upon the sidewalk might recognize that vehicles are crossing the sidewalk and could 
present a danger to the person on the sidewalk, a traveler might not discover the danger 
until it is too late to avoid it, as was Appellant's misfortune. (R. 164 Appellant's 
Undisputed Fact No. 1.) Bank of Utah cannot expect travelers on the public way to stop 
prior to proceeding, as those on the sidewalk are reasonable in assuming that the way is 
safe and acting upon that assumption. Pedestrians or other travelers also should not be 
required to cross Washington Boulevard, a busy thoroughfare in its own right, in order to 
avoid the danger posed by Appellee's egress. Based on all of these factors, Bank of Utah 
owed Appellant, as well as the public at large, a duty of care, a duty that it could not 
satisfy by simply placing a stop sign near the sidewalk, and otherwise failing to warn or 
protect passersby from exiting vehicles. 
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D. Statutory basis for imposing duty of care on Bank of Utah 
At the time of the accident and injury in question, Utah state law imposed an 
affirmative duty on private property owners to maintain their property free from any 
obstructions to drivers. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-19(1) (recently amended and recodified 
as § 41-6a-216) provided in relevant part: 
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his property any 
tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of it, which, by 
obstructing the view of any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard. 
The use of the word "shall" in the statutory language makes the provisions mandatory for 
the property owner, Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah App. 1992). 
Accordingly, a landowner has the affirmative duty to remove obstructions from his 
property. 
Likewise, Bank of Utah owed a duty to Appellant to maintain the property 
abutting the public sidewalk and the egress from its property free from obstructions of 
any kind. The fact that Bank of Utah did not do this directly caused the accident at issue. 
Appellant clearly indicated that he had difficulty seeing any approaching vehicle exiting 
the drive-thru as a direct result of the obstruction directly adjacent to Bank of Utah's exit. 
(R. 164 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 1.) Tanisha Phitsnoukanh also stated that she 
could not see anyone approaching from the south as a result of the building directly 
adjacent to the exit. (R. 112 Appellee's Undisputed Fact 10.) Finally, Officer Peterson 
attributed the accident to the fact that the driver, Tanisha, could not see Appellant 
approaching as a result of the building obstructing her view. (R. 164, 165 Appellant's 
Undisputed Fact Nos. 2 and 3.) Dr. Gomer likewise stated that the building prevented 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exiting drivers from seeing pedestrians and others traveling on the sidewalk from the 
south. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 7.) The state of Utah places a duty on 
property owners to prevent these traffic hazards to keep people in Appellant's position 
safe from harm. The Court should not permit Bank of Utah to avoid this duty and escape 
liability for its negligence. 
E. Duty recognized by the Court 
Even if the Court did not determine that Bank of Utah owed Appellant a duty 
under the foregoing arguments, consideration of the factors generally giving rise to a duty 
establishes that such a requirement should be placed on Bank of Utah in this instance. 
Imposition of a duty is based on four factors: foreseeability; likelihood of injury; the 
magnitude of the burden on Bank of Utah to guard against that injury; and the 
consequences of placing that burden upon Bank of Utah. Little v. Utah Div. Of Family 
Serv,, 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Utah 1983). 
"The mere fact that a particular kind of accident has not happened before does not 
... show that such accident is one which might not reasonably have been foreseen." Rose 
v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, % 15, 67 P,3d 1017 (quoting Williams v. Melbv, 699 
P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985)). However, the risk of injury and potential for harm to 
pedestrians and passers-by should have been known and obvious to Bank of Utah. 
Accordingly, once Bank of Utah knew or should have known of the danger, it had to take 
reasonable and appropriate steps to warn a passerby of that potential danger. 
In Boggs Exrel Boggs v. Lay, 164 S,W.3d 4 (Missouri App.Ct. 2005) the 
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against an abutting landowner because two of the 
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• 
vehicles that were ingressing and egressing the property had parked on each side of the 
driveway to which he was exiting. The truck to his left would not let him look down the 
street, the truck to his right would not let him look up the street and therefore he pulled 
out into the street and was hit by a third car. The Court essentially ruled as follows: 
I 
"An abutting owner will be held liable for injuries sustained by travelers 
lawfully using the road as a result of the condition that the owner has been 
instrumental in creating or maintaining." ' 164 S.W.3d at 16. 
The Court further stated: 
Missouri Court recognized two exceptions to the general rule that 
an abutting property owner is under no duty to maintain a public 
road in a safe condition. Under the first,' special-use' exception, 
a duty will be imposed when an abutting property owner puts an 
obstruction on the public road which was not a part of the 
original construction in order to serve his own purposes, or, when I 
the abutting owner has made use of the public road for some 
other purpose than merely using it as a road, such as a driveway 
or a public walkway. 
164S.W.3datl6. < 
The Court further stated thus: " . . . the abutting owner will be liable when he uses the 
road for his own private benefit or convenience and fails to exercise reasonable care to 
i 
prevent injury to persons lawfully using the way." Boggs, supra. J64 S.W.3d at 16. 
See also, O'Connell vs. Roper Electric Company, Inc. 498 S.W.2d 847 (Mo, 
App.Ct. 1973) (holding that an abutting landowner had a duty to maintain that portion of 
the public roadway that it had fenced off and used as a private walkway for it's 
employees). 
n 
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While the Court in the Boggs, supra, case held that the Defendant was not 
responsible to the Plaintiff under a special use doctrine because other people were 
allowed to use the street, however the Court ruled that the Defendant did have a duty 
under the second exception to the general rule that an abutting property owner is under no 
duty to maintain the public road in a safe condition. Under the second exception, a duty 
is imposed on an abutting property owner when he artificially creates, through negligence 
or affirmative action, a condition on a public road which makes passage unsafe. When 
the abutting property owner creates a dangerous condition on the public road the law will 
impose a duty of reasonable care to guard the public from injury. 
Finally, the Court stated: "[Defendants] operation of the red - green light for 
access on to its scales, its closure of the MO-CON parking lot, and its instructions that the 
first - priority mill haulers should pass the other, parked trucks, all affirmatively created a 
condition on Holt Street that made passage unsafe. Because the convergence of 
[Defendants] actions created a dangerous condition on Holt Street, we hold it had a duty 
to exercise ordinary care to guard the public from injury." Boggs, supra, 164 S.W. 3d at 
17. 
It should also be noticed that the Defendant in the Boggs case tried to make the 
defense that it was the truck drivers acts of blocking the Plaintiffs driveway that acted as 
an intervening cause the Court disagreed stating: 
Here [Defendant] set in motion the chain of circumstances 
leading to the Plaintiffs injuries . . . . 
The truck drives actions of blocking the Plaintiffs driveway 
were not wholly independent and unrelated to [Defendants] 
conduct, but rather flowed from [Defendants] actions.... The 
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I 
truck drivers action of blocking the Plaintiffs driveway did not 
interrupt the chain of events set in motion by [Defendant] but 
rather, instead, contributed to the events leading to the P laintiffs I 
injuries. And thus, accordingly, the truck drivers actions did not 
constitute an intervening cause so as to sever the causation 
between [Defendants] conduct and the Plaintiffs injury. 
Id 
A review of the remaining factors also weighs in favor of imposing this duty on 
Bank of Utah. The likelihood of injury is great; at a minimum, drivers exiting via the 
egress in question could not see pedestrians or travelers approaching from the south, 
increasing the probability of a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian. (R. 164, 165 
Appellant's Undisputed Fact Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8.) Such a collision, even at low speeds, 
would carry a high likelihood of injury. When weighed against the simple and relatively 
inexpensive remedies - e.g., a mirror, signage and other visual and auditory warnings for 
persons utilizing the sidewalk - imposing a duty on Bank of Utah seems quite minimal 
(R, 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 9.) Likewise, requiring other persons or entities 
to take precautions to warn passersby of possible danger is to be encouraged, not 
minimized. When any person creates or enhances the risk to pedestrians, that person 
should be under a duty to take reasonable steps to promote and ensure the safety of the 
pedestrian. 
Love v. Clam Box, Inc., 232 N.Y.S,2d 924 (N.Y. Sup. 1962) concrete laid in front 
of the door which acted as ingress and egress to a public restaurant but was a public 
sidewalk and therefore not under the care or control of the restaurant. The court ruled: 
Even if the defective condition (in this case freshly laid cement) was 
in the public sidewalk and thus part of an area over which defendant had no 
15 
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control and no duty of maintenance, nevertheless since it was contiguous to 
the door used for ingress and egress, defendant's duty of protection and 
warning to its patrons would not lessen. Whether it was the defendant who 
caused the work to be done in which event it is charged with actual notice, 
or whether it was done by one not engaged by said defendant, the very 
nature of the defect might justify an inference by a jury that the defendant 
was, or should have been, aware of the concealed hazardous condition, and 
was negligent in not posting a warning or in not erecting a barrier. 
232N.Y.S.2dat925,926. 
In Krug v. Wanner, 145 A.2d 612 (NJ. 1958) the court stated: 
[0]ur courts have justly not permitted it to defeat recovery where the 
injured party established that the condition of the sidewalk was actually the 
result of the abutting owner or occupier's own wrongful conduct or 
constituted, in broad legal contemplation, a nuisance which the abutting 
owner or occupier had either originally created or had thereafter 
participated in maintaining. (Citations omitted.) 
145A.2dat615. 
An abutting landowner may be held liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a 
public sidewalk where, inter alia, the landowner negligently constructed or repaired the 
sidewalk or otherwise created the defective condition, or caused the defect to occur by 
some special use of the sidewalk. Utah follows this general proposition. In Rose v. Provo 
City, 67 P.3d 1017(Utah App. 2003) this court ruled: "When an abutting landowner 
makes 'special use' of a public sidewalk, or as in the present case, a planter strip, he has a 
duty that runs with the land to use 'due care' to keep it in a 'suitable and safe' condition 
for the public to travel over." 67 P.3d at 1021. 
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In Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 542 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1975) the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated: 
The court apparently assumed that the Bank owed no duty to the 
plaintiff, since it did not own the land wherein lay the hole. This is a false 
assumption. By utilizing the area between the street and sidewalk and by 
undertaking to keep it level, the Bank became charged with a duty to do so 
in a nonnegligent manner the same as if it had owned the land. 
542P.2datl090. 
In Tripp v. Granite Holding Co., 450 P.2d 99 (Utah 1969) the Supreme Court ruled: 
"There exists no obligation on the part of an abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining his 
premises in repair, nor is he liable for any state of disrepair. His obligation can only arise 
where he creates through use or otherwise some unsafe or dangerous condition." 
(Emphasis mine.) 450 P.2d at 99. Clearly the Supreme Court recognized in 1969 a duty if 
the abutting property owner creates through use, or otherwise, some unsafe or dangerous 
condition. This is exactly what the Bank of Utah did. 
In Salt Lake City v. Schubach, United Pac. Ins. Co., Intervener, 159 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1945) the Supreme Court in viewing the liability of an adjoining property owner to 
a pedestrian on the sidewalk stated: "The adjoining owner has no more right than any 
other person to do an act which renders the use of the sidewalk hazardous, or less secure 
that [sic] it would be but for such an act. When he does so he is guilty of a nuisance and 
liable to any person, who using due care, is injured thereby." 159 P.2d at 152. 
Although the facts of the case at bar are not exact the surrounding states to the 
state of Utah recognize the general proposition that an abutting owner of property may 
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have a duty imposed for creating a danger which causes a sidewalk to become unsafe. 
Arizona had a law requiring the abutting landowner to keep the sidewalk safe for 
travelers, but such duty is not absolute and in Beltran v. Stroud, 160 P.24 765 (Ariz. 
1945) the Arizona court acknowledged that where obstruction of street is unlawful and 
detracts from travelers' safety, author of obstruction will be liable for injuries resulting 
from its maintenance although other causes subsequently arising contribute to injury. 
"Where one obstructs a highway in such a manner as to cause pedestrians to walk on or 
near the paved portion thereof, he may reasonably anticipate that injury to a pedestrian 
may occur. In any event, it would be a question for the jury under all the facts and 
circumstances of the case." 160 P.2d at 768. 
See also Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 114 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1941) 
(Abutting property owner owes duty to public to do no affirmative act that will create a 
dangerous condition in the street fronting his property); McKinley v. Fanning, 595 P.2d 
1084 (Idaho 1979) (Abutting property owner owes duty to public to do no affirmative act 
that will create a dangerous condition in the street fronting his property); Key v. Lerner 
Shops of Colorado, Inc., 472 P.2d 752 (Colo. App. 1970) (Owner or occupant of property 
abutting public sidewalks owes no duty to pedestrians to keep the walk free from ice and 
snow which has accumulated through natural causes; however, the owner may not create 
a hazardous condition on a public sidewalk by negligently constructing or maintaining his 
premises so as to discharge water on the walk.); Herndon v. Arco Petroleum Co., 536 
P.2d 1023 (Nev. 1975) (In action brought by pedestrian against service station after 
pedestrian slipped on icy portion of service station private driveway which crossed public 
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sidewalk and broke his hip and leg, there was material fact issue, precluding summary 
judgment, as to whether service station's special use of portion of driveway, rather than 
natural accumulation of ice and snow, resulted in hazard encountered by pedestrian.); and 
Pauley v. Newman, 92 P.3d 819 (Wyo. 2004) (Homeowner owed duty of care to 
pedestrian to clear ice on sidewalk near homeowner's garage only if ice was result of 
unnatural accumulation of precipitation or if homeowner created or aggravated the 
hazard.) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant Cameron Smith respectfully requests that 
Appellee Bank of Utah's Summary Judgment be overturned. At the very least it should 
be an issue for the jury to determine where fault lies in the injury to Appellant. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2006. 
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C 
J. PauyStockdale 
Attorneys(for Appellant Cameron Smith 
By: 
J. Paul Stockdale 
Attorney for Appellant Cameron Smith 
Original Signature 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELANT were mailed, postpaid, to the following this 12th day of June 2006. 
Nathan Morris 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER, & NELSON 
Key Bank tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 568 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
lenying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
>ourt of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
eview those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
lubsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
f Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its 
9view of agency adjudicative proceedings. 2001 
8-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
8-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and pract ice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
ridence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
tanage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
te rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
ourt upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
' the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
te Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
dges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties, 
idges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
tah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
w, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
scipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
-2-4.5. Admission to s tate bar — Criminal history 
background checks . 
(1) The Utah State Bar shall require each person applying 
• admission to the Utah State Bar to submit a complete set 
fingerprints for the purpose of conducting a national crim-
d history background check. 
2) Fingerprints of applicants for admission to the Utah 
ite Bar shall be submitted to the Department of Public 
fety, Bureau of Criminal Identification to be used to conduct 
criminal history background check and to the Federal 
reau of Investigation to obtain a national criminal history 
jkground check. 
3) The criminal history background information obtained 
m the Department of Public Safety and the national crim-
1 history background information obtained from the Fed-
1 Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this section may be 
id by the Utah State Bar to determine an applicant's 
xacter, fitness, and suitability for admission to the Utah 
te Bar. 2001 
2-5. Repealed. 1988 
2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
he appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
port staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Lrt and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
port staff shall be established by the appellate court 
linistrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
rt . . 1986 
5-7. Repealed. 1986 
5-7.5. Serv ice of sher i f f t o court. 
l e court may at any t ime require the attendance and 
ices of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
1-8 to 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d . 1986,1988 
C H A P T E R 2 a 
COURT O F APPEALS 
ion 
a-1. Creation — Seal. 
a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Fifing fees. 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Funct ions — 
Fi l ing fees . 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in tha t office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
ru\ 1~ ^ — A* »• • • 
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567 JUDICIAL CODE 78-2-2 
i 
78-1-2.2. N u m b e r of d i s t r i c t judges . 
The number of district court judges shall be: 
(1) four district judges in the First District; 
(2) 14 district judges in the Second District; 
(3) 28 district judges in the Third District; 
(4). 12 district judges in the Fourth District; 
(5) five district judges in the Fifth District; 
(6) two district judges in the Sixth District; 
(7) three district judges in the Seventh District; and 
(8) two district judges in the Eighth District. 2004 
78-1-2.3. Number of juven i l e judges and jurisdict ions. 
The number of juvenile court judges shall be: 
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District; 
(2) six juvenile judges in the Second Juvenile District; 
(3) nine juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District; 
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District; 
(5) two juvenile judges in the Fifth Juvenile District; 
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District; 
(7) two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile Dis-
trict; and 
(8) one juvenile judge in the Eighth Juvenile District. 
2005 




78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and 












Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
Repealed. 
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
Admission to state bar — Criminal history back-
ground checks. 
Repealed. 
Appellate court administrator. 
Repealed. 
Service of sheriff to court. 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
78-2-1. Number of jus t i ces — Terms — Chief jus t ice 
and associate chief just ice — Select ion and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in January follow-
ing the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of tho Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law. 
* (6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice as consistent with law. 1990 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971,1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the s tate engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a s ta tu te of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the mat ters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
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41-6a-1008. Vehicle crossing sidewalk — Operator to 
yield. 
The operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the 
right-of-way to any pedestrian and all other traffic, on the 
sidewalk. 2005 
41-6a-1009. Use of r o a d w a y by p e d e s t r i a n s — Proh ib -
ited activities. 
(1) Where there is a sidewalk provided and its use is 
practicable, a pedestrian may not walk along or on an adjacent 
roadway. 
(2) Where a sidewalk is not provided, a pedestrian walking 
along or on a highway shall walk only on the shoulder, as far 
as practicable from the edge of the roadway. 
(3) Where a sidewalk or a shoulder is not available, a 
pedestrian walking along or on a highway shall: 
(a) walk as near as practicable to the outside edge of 
the roadway; and 
(b) if on a two-way roadway, walk only on the left side 
of the roadway facing traffic. 
(4) A person may not sit, stand, or loiter on or near a 
roadway for the purpose of soliciting from the occupant of a 
vehicle: 
(a) a ride; 
(b) contributions; 
(c) employment; 
(d) the parking, watching, or guarding of a vehicle; or 
(e) other business. 
(5) A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree which renders the pedestrian a hazard may 
not walk or be on a highway except on a sidewalk or sidewalk 
area. 
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a pedes-
trian on a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
on the roadway. 2005 
41-6a-1010. Unmarked crosswalk locations — Restric-
tions on pedestrian. 
(1) A highway authority in its respective jurisdiction may, 
after an engineering and traffic investigation, designate un-
marked crosswalk locations where: 
(a) pedestrian crossing is prohibited; or 
(b) pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles. 
(2) The restrictions in Subsection (1) are effective only 
when traffic-control devices indicating the restrictions are in 
place. 2005 
41-6a-1011. Pedestr ian vehic les . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) (i) "Pedestrian vehicle" means a self-propelled con-
veyance designed, manufactured, and intended for 
the exclusive use of a person with a physical disabil-
ity. 
(ii) A "pedestrian vehicle" may not: 
(A) exceed 48 inches in width; 
(B) have an engine or motor with more than 
300 cubic centimeters displacement or with more 
than 12 brake horsepower; and 
(C) be capable of developing a speed in excess 
of 30 miles per hour. 
(b) "Physical disability" means any bodily impairment 
which precludes a person from walking or otherwise 
moving about as a pedestrian. 
(2) (a) A pedestrian vehicle operated by a physically dis-
abled person is exempt from vehicle registration, inspec-
tion, and operator license requirements. 
(b) Authority to operate a pedestrian vehicle on public 
highways or sidewalks shall be granted according to rules 
promulgated by the commissioner of public safety. 
(3) (a) A physically disabled person may operate a pedes-
trian vehicle with a motor of not more than .5 brake 
horsepower capable of developing a speed of not more 
than eight miles per hour: 
(i) on the sidewalk; and 
(ii) in all places where pedestrians are allowed. 
(b) A permit, license, registration, authority, applica-
tion, or restriction may not be required or imposed on a 
physically disabled person operating a pedestrian vehicle 
under this Subsection (3). 
(c) The provisions of this Subsection (3) supercede the 
provision of Subsection (2)(b). 2005 
PART 11 
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION 
41-6a-1101. Parents and guardians may not authorize 
child's violat ion of chapter. 
The parent or guardian of a child may not authorize or 
knowingly permit the child to violate any of the provisions of 
this chapter. 2005 
41-6a«1102. Bicycle and device propelled by human 
power and moped riders subject to chapter — 
Exception. 
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2) or as otherwise 
specified under this part, a person operating a bicycle, a 
vehicle or device propelled by human power, or a moped has all 
the rights and is subject to the provisions of this chapter 
applicable to the operator of any other vehicle. 
(2) A person operating a nonmotorized bicycle or a vehicle 
or device propelled by human power is not subject to the 
penalties related to operator licenses under alcohol and drug-
related traffic offenses. 2005 
41-6a-1103. Carrying more persons than design per-
mits prohibited — Exception. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a bicycle or moped 
may not be used to carry more persons at one time than the 
number for which it is designed or equipped. 
(2) An adult rider may carry a child securely attached to the 
adult rider's person in a back pack or sling. 2005 
41-6a-1104. Persons on bicycles, mopeds, skates, and 
sleds not to attach to moving vehicles — Ex-
ception. 
(1) A person riding a bicycle, moped, coaster, skate board, 
roller skates, sled, or toy vehicle may not attach it or a person 
to any moving vehicle on a highway. 
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or 
semitrailer to a bicycle or moped if tha t trailer or semitrailer 
has been designed for attachment. 2005 
41-6a«1105. Operation of bicycle or moped on and use 
of roadway — Duties , prohibitions. 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped on a roadway at 
less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and 
under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as 
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway except 
when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction; 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or 
into a private road or driveway; 
(c) traveling straight through an intersection that has 
a right-turn only lane that is in conflict with the straight 
through movement; or 
(d) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions that make 
it unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge of the 
roadway including: 
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'811 MOTOR VEHICLES 41-6a-216 
is;-
(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a 
criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under 
1 this section; or 
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe 
m that the property has been used in violation of the 
I provisions of Section 41-6a-210. 
13) (a) Property taken or detained under this section is not 
E
 repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement 
I agency making the seizure, subject only to the orders and 
f decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. 
I (b) When property is seized under this section, the 
| appropriate person or agency may: 
(i) place the property under seal; 
(ii) remove the property to a place designated by 
§£ the warrant under which it was seized; or 
E (iii) take custody of the property and remove it to 
m an appropriate location for disposition in accordance 
1 with law. 2005 
| 4i-6a-212. Emergency vehicles — Policy regarding ve-
i l hide pursuits — Applicability of traffic law to 
highway work vehicles — Exemptions. 
f(l) Subject to Subsections (2) through (5), the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle may exercise the privileges 
Planted under this section when: 
(a) responding to an emergency call; 
(b) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
} the law; or 
| r (c) responding to but not upon returning from a fire 
| alarm. 
' (2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this 
m chapter; 
1 (b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but 
only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe 
M operation; 
| (c) exceed the maximum speed limits, unless prohib-
ited by a local highway authority under Section 41-6a-
| 208; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of move-
I ment or turning in specified directions. 
..: (3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of 
** an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a 
vehicle pursuit, apply only when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal 
under Section 41-6a-1625; or 
(b) uses a visual signal with emergency lights in accor-
j dance with rules made under Section 41-6a-1601, which is 
[• visible from in front of the vehicle. 
; (4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of 
jPp- authorized emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle 
jj^pursuit apply only when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle: 
(i) sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6a-
1625; and 
(ii) uses a visual signal with emergency lights in 
accordance with rules made under Section 41-6a-
1601, which is visible from in front of the vehicle; 
5
 (b) the public agency employing the operator of the 
vehicle has, in effect, a written policy which describes the 
manner and circumstances in which any vehicle pursuit 
should be conducted and terminated; 
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in 
accordance with the written policy described in Subsec-
tion (4)(b); and 
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in confor-
mance with standards established under Subsection (5). 
© In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin-
i s t r a t i v e Rulemaking Act, the Department of Public Safety 
shall make rules providing minimum standards for all emer-
gency pursuit policies tha t are adopted by public agencies 
authorized to operate emergency pursuit vehicles. 
(6) The privileges granted under this section do not relieve 
the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle of the duty to 
act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator in like 
circumstances. 
(7) Except for Sections 41-6a-210, 41-6a-502, and 41-6a-
528, this chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, 
and other equipment while actually engaged in work on the 
surface of a highway. 2005 
41-6a-213. Persons riding or driving animals subject 
to chapter — Exceptions. 
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2), a person who 
is riding an animal or who is driving an animal-drawn vehicle 
on a roadway is subject to this chapter. 
(2) Driver license sanctions for alcohol or drug related 
traffic offenses do not apply to a person specified under 
Subsection (1). 2005 
41-6a-214. Quasi-public roads and parking areas — 
Local ordinances. 
(1) As used in this section, "quasi-public road or parking 
area" means a privately owned and maintained road or park-
ing area that is generally held open for use of the public for 
purposes of vehicular travel or parking. 
(2) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance pro-
vide that a quasi-public road or parking area within the 
municipality or county is subject to this chapter. 
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this section 
without: 
(i) a public hearing; and 
(ii) the agreement of a majority of the owners of 
the quasi-public road or parking area involved. 
(3) This section: 
(a) supercedes conflicting provisions under Section 41-
6a-215; 
(b) does not require a peace officer to patrol or enforce 
any provisions of this chapter on any quasi-public road or 
parking area; or 
(c) does not affect the duty of a peace officer to enforce 
those provisions of this chapter applicable to private 
property other than under this section. 2005 
41-6a-215. Right of real property owner to regulate 
traffic. 
Except as provided under Section 41-6a-214, this chapter 
does not prevent the owner of real property used by the public 
for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner 
and not as matter of right from: 
(1) prohibiting the use; 
(2) requiring other conditions not specified in this 
chapter; or 
(3) otherwise regulating the use as preferred by the 
owner. 2005 
41-6a-216. Removal of plants or other obstructions 
impairing view — Notice to owner — Penalty. 
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his 
property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of 
it that constitutes a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of 
an operator of a vehicle on a highway. 
(2) When a highway authority determines on the basis of an 
engineering and traffic investigation that a traffic hazard 
exists, it shall notify the owner and order that the hazard be 
removed within ten days. 
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazard 
within ten days is a class C misdemeanor. . *.. 2005 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(a) unless Subsection (2) applies, slow down and check 
that the tracks are clear of an approaching train; 
(b) stop within 50 feet, but not closer than 15 feet, from 
the nearest rail of the railroad track before reaching the 
crossing if the tracks are not clear; 
(c) obey all traffic control devices or the directions of a 
peace officer, or other crossing official at the crossing; and 
(d) before proceeding over a railroad grade crossing: 
(i) ensure that the vehicle has sufficient space to 
drive completely through a railroad grade crossing 
without stopping; and 
(ii) ensure that the vehicle has sufficient undercar-
riage clearance to safely and completely pass through 
the crossing. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the driver of 
any vehicle described in 49 CFR 392.10 shall stop within 
50 feet, but not closer than 15 feet, from the nearest rail 
of the railroad track before crossing, at grade, any track of 
a railroad. 
(b) While stopped, the driver shall look in both direc-
tions along the track for any sign of an approaching train 
and look and listen for signals indicating the approach of 
any train,; 
(c) The driver may proceed across the railroad track 
only when the movement may be made with reasonable 
safety. 
(d) After stopping as required and upon safely proceed-
ing, the driver shall only cross the railroad track in a gear 
that ensures no necessity for manually changing gears 
while traversing the crossing. 
(e) The driver may not manually shift gears while 
crossing the railroad track. 
(3) This section does not apply at a: 
(a) railroad grade crossing where traffic is controlled by 
a peace officer or other crossing official; 
(b) railroad grade crossing where traffic is regulated by 
a traffic-control signal; 
(c) railroad grade crossing where an official traffic-
control device gives notice that the stopping requirements 
of this section are not applicable; or 
(d) other railroad grade crossings excluded under 49 
CFR 392.10. 2001 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-lOO.j 
41-6-99. Designation of through highways — St< 
signs, yield signs and traffic-control devic 
— Designation of intersections as locatioi 
for preferential right-of-way treatment. 
The Department of Transportation with reference to sta 
highways and local authorities with reference to highway 
under their jurisdiction may erect and maintain stop sign, 
yield signs, or other official traffic-control devices to designai 
through highways, or to designate intersections or othe 
roadway junctions at which vehicular traffic on one or more c 
the roadways should yield or stop and yield before entering 
the intersection or junction. 197 
41-6-100. Vehicles emerging from alleys, buildings, pri 
vate roads or driveways must stop prior tc 
sidewalk area or street. 
The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, 
private road or driveway within a business or residence 
district shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving 
onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across 
such alley, building entrance, road or driveway, or in the event 
there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the 
street to be entered where the driver has a view of approach-
ing traffic thereon. 1978 
2001 
41-6-98. Duties respecting crawler type tractor, power 
shovel, derrick, or other equipment or struc-
ture. 
(1) A person may not operate or move any crawler type 
tractor, power shovel^ derrick, roller or any equipment or 
structure having normal operating speed of ten or less miles 
per hour or a vertical body or load clearance of less than Vi 
inch per foot of the distance between any two adjacent axles or 
in any event of less than nine inches measured above the level 
surface of a roadway upon or across any tracks at a railroad 
grade crossing without first complying with this section. 
(2) Notice of an intended crossing under this section shall 
be given to the railroad and a reasonable time shall be given 
to the railroad to provide proper protection at the crossing. 
(3) (a) Before making a crossing under this section the 
person operating or moving the vehicle or equipment shall 
first stop within 50 feet but not closer than 15 feet from 
the nearest rail of the railway. 
(b) While stopped, the driver shall listen and look in 
both directions along the track for any approaching train 
and for signals indicating the approach of a railroad train. 
(c) The driver may proceed across the track only when 
, the crossing can be made safely. 
(4) The driver shall obey all traffic control devices or the 
directions of a peace officer or other crossing official at the ' 
crossing. 2001. 
j 
41-6-100.10. School bus — Signs and light signals — 
Flashing amber lights — Flashing red lights 
— Passing school bus — Duty to stop — Travel 
in opposite direction — Penalties. 
(1) Every school bus, when operated for the transportation 
of school children, shall: 
(a) bear upon the front and rear of the bus a plainly 
visible sign containing the words "school bus" in letters 
not less than eight inches in height, which shall be 
removed or covered when the vehicle is not in use for the 
transportation of school children; and 
(b) be equipped with alternating flashing amber and 
red light signals visible from the front and rear, of a type 
approved and mounted as prescribed by the department. 
(2) The operator of any vehicle upon a highway, upon 
meeting or overtaking any school bus equipped with signals 
required under this section which is displaying alternating 
flashing: 
(a) amber warning light signals, shall slow his vehicle, 
but may proceed past the school bus using due care and 
caution at a speed not greater than specified in Subsection 
41-6-46(2) for school zones for the safety of the school 
children that may be in the vicinity; or 
(b) red light signals visible from the front or rear shall 
stop immediately before reaching the bus and may not 
proceed until the flashing red light signals cease opera-
tion. 
(3) The operator of a vehicle need not stop upon meeting or 
passing a school bus displaying alternating flashing red light 
signals if the school bus is traveling in the opposite direction 
when: 
(a) traveling upon a divided highway; 
(b) the bus is stopped at an intersection or other place 
controlled by. a traffic-control signal or by a peace officer; 
or 
(c) upon a highway of five or more lanes, which may | 
include a left-turn lane or two-way left turn lane. 
(4) (a) The operator of a school bus shall operate alternat- j 
ing flashing red light signals at all times when children 
are unloading from a school bus to cross a highway, or 
when a school bus is stopped for the purpose of loading h 
children who must cross a highway to board the bus, or at 
any other time when it would be hazardous for vehicles to [ 
proceed past the stopped school bus. 
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41-6-87.3. Bicyc les and human powered vehic le or de-
vice to y ie ld right-of-way to pedestr ians on 
s idewalks , paths, or trails — Uses prohibited 
— Neg l igen t coll ision prohibited — Speed re-
str ict ions — Rights and dut ies same as pedes -
t r i a n s . 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or any vehicle or device 
propelled by human power shall yield the right-of-way to any 
pedestrian and shall give audible signal before overtaking and 
passing a pedestrian. 
(2) A person may not operate a bicycle or a vehicle or device 
propelled by human power on a sidewalk, path, or trail, or 
across a roadway in a crosswalk, where prohibited by official 
traffic-control devices or ordinance. 
(3) A person may not operate a bicycle or any vehicle or 
device propelled by human power in a negligent manner so as 
to collide with any pedestrian or other person operating a 
bicycle or any vehicle or device propelled by human power. 
(4) A person operating a bicycle or a vehicle or device 
propelled by human power on a sidewalk, path, or trail, or 
across a driveway, or across a roadway on a crosswalk may not 
operate at a speed•, greater than is reasonable and prudent 
under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing. 
(5) Except as provided under Subsections (1) and (4), a 
person operating a bicycle or a vehicle or device propelled by 
human power on a sidewalk, path, or trail, or across a roadway 
on a crosswalk, has all the rights and duties applicable to a 
pedestrian under the same circumstances. 2001 
41-6-87.4. Bicyc les — Parking on s idewalk, roadway — 
Prohibit ions . 
(1) A person may park a bicycle on a sidewalk unless 
prohibited or restricted by an official traffic-control device. 
(2) A bicycle parked on a sidewalk may not impede the 
normal and reasonable movement of pedestrian or other 
traffic. 
(3) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway at any angle to 
the curb or edge of the roadway at any location where parking 
is allowed. 
(4) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway abreast of 
another bicycle or bicycles near the side of the roadway at any 
location where parking is allowed. 
(5) A bicycle may not be parked on a roadway in a manner 
as to obstruct the movement of a legally parked motor vehicle. 
(6) In all other respects, bicycles parked anywhere on a 
highway shall conform with the provisions of Article 14 of this 
chapter, regarding the parking of vehicles. 1987 
41-6-87.5. Bicyc les and mopeds — Turns — Des ignated 
lanes . 
(1) A person riding a bicycle or moped and intending to turn 
left shall comply with Section 41-6-66 or Subsection (2). 
(2) A person riding a bicycle or moped intending to turn left 
shall approach the tu rn as close as practicable to the right 
curb or edge of the roadway. After proceeding across the 
intersecting roadway, to the far corner of the curb or intersec-
tion of the roadway edges, the bicyclist or moped operator 
shall stop, as far out of the way of traffic as practical. After 
stopping he shall yield to any traffic proceeding in either 
direction along the roadway he had been using. After yielding 
and complying with any official traffic-control device or peace 
officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), the Depart-
ment of Transportation and local authorities in their respec-
tive jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be 
placed and require and direct that a specific course be traveled 
by turning bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, 
a person may not tu rn a bicycle other than as directed by the 
devices. 1987 
41-6-87.7. Bicycles a n d m o p e d s — T u r n s igna l s — Ex-
ceptions. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person riding a 
bicycle or moped shall comply with Section 41-6-69. 
(2) A person is not required to signal by hand and arm. 
continuously if the hand is needed in the control or operation 
of the bicycle or moped. 
(3) A person operating a bicycle or moped and who is 
stopped in a lane designated for turning traffic only is not 
required to signal prior to making the turning movement. 
2001 
41-6-87.8. Bicycle and m o p e d in spec t i ons — At r e q u e s t 
of officer. 
A peace officer may at any time upon reasonable cause to 
believe tha t a bicycle or moped is unsafe or not equipped as 
required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper 
adjustment or repair, require the person riding the bicycle or 
moped to stop and submit the bicycle or moped to an inspec-
tion and a test as appropriate. 1987 
41-6-87.9. Bicycle racing — W h e n approved — Prohibi-
t ions — Exceptions — Authorized exempt ions 
from traffic laws . 
(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under Section 
41-6-51, except as authorized in this section. . 
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when a racing 
event is approved by state or local authorities on any highway 
under their respective jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle high-
way racing events may be granted only under conditions 
which assure reasonable safety for all race participants, 
spectators, and other highway users, and which prevent 
unreasonable interference with traffic flow which would seri-
ously inconvenience other highway users. 
(3) By agreement with the approving authority, partici-
pants in an approved bicycle highway racing event may be 
exempted from compliance with any traffic laws otherwise 
applicable, if traffic control is adequate to assure the safety of 
all highway users. 1987 
41-6-88. Bicycles and m o p e d s — C a r r y i n g bundle — 
One hand o n h a n d l e b a r s . 
A person operating a bicycle or moped may not carry any 
package, bundle, or article which prevents the use of both 
hands in the control and operation of the bicycle or moped. A 
person operating a bicycle or moped shall keep at least one 
hand on the handlebars at all times. 1987 
41-6-89. Bicycle — Prohibi ted equipment — Brakes 
required. 
(1) A bicycle may not be equipped with, and a person may 
not use upon a bicycle, any siren or whistle. 
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake or brakes 
which enable its driver to stop the bicycle within 25 feet from 
a speed of 10 miles per hour on dry, level, clean pavement. 
1987 
41-6-90. Bicyc les — Lamps and reflective material re-
quired. 
(1) Every bicycle in use at the times described in Section 
41-6-118 shall be equipped with a: 
(a) lamp of a type approved by the department which is 
on the front emitting a white light visible from a distance 
of at least 500 feet to the front; and 
(b) (i) red reflector of a type approved by the depart-
ment which is visible for 500 feet to the rear when 
directly in front of lawful lower beams of head lamps 
on a motor vehicle; or 
(ii) red taillight designed for use on a bicycle and 
emitting flashing or nonflashing light visible from a 
distance of 500 feet to the rear. 
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41-6-80.5. Vehicle c r o s s i n g s i d e w a l k — O p e r a t o r t o 
y ie ld . 
The operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the 
right-of-way to any pedestrian and all other traffic on the 
sidewalk. 1987 
41-6-81. Repea l ed . 1987 
41-6-82. U s e of r o a d w a y b y p e d e s t r i a n s — P r o h i b i t e d 
ac t iv i t i es . 
(1) Where there is a sidewalk provided and its use is 
practicable, a pedestrian may not walk along and upon an 
adjacent roadway. 
(2) Where a sidewalk is not provided, a pedestrian walking 
along and upon a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far 
as practicable from the edge of the roadway. 
(3) Where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is available, a 
pedestrian walking along or upon a highway shall walk as 
near as practicable to an outside edge of the roadway, and if on 
a two-way roadway, shall walk only on the left side of the 
roadway. 
(4) A person may not sit, stand, or loiter in or near a 
roadway for the purpose of soliciting from the occupant of any 
vehicle a ride, contributions, employment, the parking, watch-
ing, or guarding of a vehicle, or other business. 
(5) A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree which renders him a hazard may not walk or 
be upon a highway except on a sidewalk or sidewalk area. 
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a pedes-
trian upon a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles upon the roadway. 1987 
41-6-82.10. U n m a r k e d c r o s s w a l k loca t ions — Res t r i c -
t i o n s on p e d e s t r i a n . 
The Department of Transportation and local authorities in 
their respective jurisdictions may after an engineering and 
traffic investigation designate unmarked crosswalk locations 
where pedestrian crossing is prohibited or where pedestrians 
shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles. The restrictions are 
effective only when official traffic-control devices indicating 
the restrictions are in place. 1987 
41-6-82.50. P e d e s t r i a n veh ic le s . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Pedestrian vehicle" means any self-propelled con-
veyance designed, manufactured, and intended for the 
exclusive use of persons with a physical.disability, but the 
vehicle may not: 
(i) exceed 48 inches in width; 
(ii) have an engine or motor with more than 300 
cubic centimeters displacement or with more than 12 
brake horsepower; and 
(iii) be capable of developing a speed in excess of 30 
miles per hour. 
(b) "Physical disability" means any bodily impairment 
which precludes a person from walking or otherwise 
moving about as a pedestrian. 
(2) A pedestrian vehicle operated by a physically disabled 
person is exempt from vehicle registration, inspection, and 
operator license requirements. Authority to operate a pedes-
trian vehicle on public highways or sidewalks shall be granted 
according to rules promulgated by the commissioner of public 
safety. 
(3) A physically disabled person may operate a pedestrian 
vehicle with a motor of not more than .5 brake horsepower 
capable of developing a speed of not more than eight miles per 
hour upon the sidewalk and in all places where pedestrians 
are allowed. No permit, license, registration, authority, appli-
cation, or restriction may be required or imposed upon a 
physically disabled person operating a pedestrian vehicle 
under this subsection. 1987 
ARTICLE 11 
BICYCLES, REGULATION O F OPERATION 
41-6-83. P a r e n t s a n d g u a r d i a n s m a y no t a u t h o r i z e 
child 's v io l a t i on of chap te r . 
The parent or guardian of any child may not authorize or 
knowingly permit the child to violate any of the provisions of 
this chapter. 1987 
41-6-84. Bicycle a n d d e v i c e p ro p e l l ed b y h u m a n p o w e r 
a n d m o p e d r i d e r s sub jec t to c h a p t e r — Excep -
t ion. 
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2) or as otherwise 
specified under this article, a person operating a bicycle or any 
vehicle or device propelled by human power or a moped has all 
the rights and is subject to the provisions of this chapter 
applicable to the operator of any other vehicle. 
(2) A person operating a nonmotorized bicycle or any vehi-
cle or device propelled by human power is not subject to the 
penalties related to operator licenses under alcohol and drug-
related traffic offenses. 1997 
41-6-85. C a r r y i n g m o r e p e r s o n s t h a n d e s i g n p e r m i t s 
p r o h i b i t e d — Excep t ion . 
A bicycle or moped may not be used to carry more persons a t 
one time than the number for which it is designed or equipped, 
except that an adult rider may carry a child securely attached 
to his person in a back pack or sling. - 1987 
41-6-86. P e r s o n s o n b icyc les , m o p e d s , ska t e s , a n d s l e d s 
no t to a t t a c h t o m o v i n g vehic les — E x c e p t i o n . 
(1) A person riding a bicycle, moped, coaster, skate board, 
roller skates, sled, or toy vehicle may not attach it or himself 
to any moving vehicle upon a highway. 
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or 
semitrailer to a bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer 
has been designed for attachment. 1987 
41-6-87. O p e r a t i o n of b icycle o r m o p e d on a n d u s e of 
r o a d w a y — D u t i e s , p roh ib i t i ons . 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway 
at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place 
and under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as 
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway except 
when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction; 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or 
into a private road or driveway; 
(c) traveling straight through an intersection tha t has 
a right-turn only lane tha t is in conflict with the straight 
through movement; or 
(d) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions that make 
it unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge of the 
roadway including fixed or moving objects, parked or 
moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface 
hazards, or a lane t ha t is too narrow for a bicycle and a 
vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane. 
(2) A person operating a bicycle or moped on a highway 
shall operate in the designated direction of traffic. 
(3) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may 
not ride more than two abreast except on paths or par ts of 
roadways set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles. Persons 
riding two abreast may not impede the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic and shall ride within a single lane. 
(4) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent 
to a roadway,, bicycle riders may be directed by official traffic-
control devices to use the pa th and not the roadway. 2001 
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(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this section 
without: 
(i) a public hearing; and 
(ii) the agreement of a majority of the owners of 
the quasi-public road or parking area involved. 
(3) The department is not required under this section to 
patrol or enforce any provisions of this chapter on any quasi-
public road or parking area, but is required to enforce those 
provisions of this chapter applicable to private property other 
than under this section.
 1999 
41-6-18. Right of real property o w n e r to regulate traf-
fic. 
This chapter does not prevent the owner of real property 
used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permis-
sion of the owner and not as matter of right from prohibiting 
the use, or from requiring other or different or additional; 
conditions other than those specified in this chapter, or other-: 
wise regulating the use as preferred by the owner, except as--
may be required under Section 41-6-17.5. 1988 
41-6-19. Removal of plants or other obstructions im-
pa ir ing v i ew — Notice to owner — Penalty. 
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his 
property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of J 
it, which, by obstructing the view of any operator, constitutes" 
a traffic hazard. 
(2) When the Department of Transportation or any locals 
authority determines upon the basis of an engineering and; 
traffic investigation that a traffic hazard exists, it shall notify; 
the owner and order that the hazard be removed within ten 
days. 
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazardV* 
within ten days is a class C misdemeanor. 1987/ 
41-6-19.5. Volunteers may be author ized to enforcer 
cer ta in parking provis ions. 
(1) Any law enforcement agency authorized to enforce park- \ 
ing laws in this s tate may appoint volunteers to issue citations : 
for violations of: 
(a) the provisions of Subsections 41-la-414(3) and (4) | 
related to parking for a person with a disability; 
(b) any municipal or county accessible parking privi-
leges ordinance for a person with a disability; or 
(c) the provisions of Subsection 41-6-103.5(4) related to« 
parking in a school bus parking zone. 
(2) A volunteer appointed under this section must be at: 
least 21 years of age. « \ 
(3) The law enforcement agency appointing a volunteer; 
may establish any other qualification for the volunteer that* 
the agency finds desirable. ; 
(4) A volunteer may not issue citations until the volunteer! 
has received training from the appointing law enforcement, 
agency. m 
(5) A citation issued by a volunteer under this section has-
the same force and effect as a citation issued by a peace officer, 
for the same offense. 1999; 
41-6-19.10. Repealed . M 
if 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or 
parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or 
official traffic-control devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assem-
blages on the highways; 
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for 
use by traffic moving in one direction under Section 
41-6-60; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public 
parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed 
. limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or 
designating any intersection or junction of roadways as a 
stop or yield intersection or junction; 
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-
408; 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring 
the registration and inspection of them, including requir-
ing a registration fee; 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or 
specified types of vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 
41-6-48; 
(k) requiring writ ten accident reports under Section 
.£1-6-42; 
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59; 
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-
access roadways by any class or kind of traffic under 
Section 41-6-65; 
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled 
streets by any class or kind of traffic found to be incom-
patible with the normal and safe movement of traffic; 
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsec-
tion 41-6-49(3); 
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets; 
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in 
a business district or any designated highway except in a 
crosswalk under Section 41-6-77; 
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked cross-
walks under Section 41-6-82.10; 
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts; 
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, 
skateboards, and other toy vehicles; 
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental 
ordinances as necessary to cover emergencies or special 
conditions; 
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding 
maximum speed limits; or 
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically 
authorized by this chapter. 
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official 
traffic-control device at any location which requires the traffic 
on any state highway to stop before entering or crossing any 
intersecting highway unless approval in writing has first been 
obtained from the Department of Transportation. 
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), 
(g)» (i)j (j)> (1), (m), (n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official 
traffic-control devices giving notice of the local traffic ordi-
nances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway or 
part of it affected as is appropriate. 2001 
41-6-17.5. Quasi-public roads and parking areas — Lo-
cal ordinances . 
(1) As used in this section, "quasi-public road or parking 
area" means a privately-owned and maintained road or park-
ing area that is generally held open for use of the public for 
purposes of vehicular travel or parking. 
(2) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance pro-
vide that a quasi-public road or parking area within the
 ( 
city or county is subject to this chapter. 
ARTICLE 3 
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS, AND MARKINGS 
41-6-20. S tandards and specifications for uniform sys- % 
tern of traffic-control dev ices and school 
cross ing guards. 
(1) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin- ;• 
istrative Rulemaking Act, the Department of Transportation
 ;; 
shall make rules: W l 
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Rule 1 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 922 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from ail final 
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law bv 
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 
the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any 
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are V 
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests 
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint 
notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after ; 
filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court 
upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipula 
tion of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shal l i l l 
be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the 
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be 
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise 
directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application 5 $ 
shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the 
respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall ., 
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate ;i 
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall ' j 
designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall ;i 
designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal j 
shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving j 
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of \\ 
each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not J 
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 1 
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be j 
filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, j 
the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party ; i 
represented by tha t counsel. I 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice 
of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party .'..-A 
taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the ] 
filing.fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall j 
not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of 
appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice 
of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond 
required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk tha t the bond 
has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt 
of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall 
be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial 
court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title 
does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be ; 
added to the title. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: w h e n taken. 
- The priority of cases for argument has been modified and 
included as part of Rule 29, rather than as an administrative 
order of the Supreme Court. 
- Definitions and procedures for the purpose of sanctions for 
delay and frivolous appeals have been added. 
- Gender specific pronouns have been removed. 
- Sample forms and checklists have been included for some 
of the more common appellate steps. 
Notes drafted by the Advisory Committee further explain 
many of these changes. The committee's notes, although not 
adopted as par t of the rules by the Supreme Court, may be 
used as a guide for the practitioner. 
Peter W. Billings, Jr. 
Chair, Advisory Commit-
tee on Appellate Rules 
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
Rule 1. Scope of rules. 
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the procedure 
before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Utah in 
all cases. Applicability of these rules to the review of decisions 
or orders of administrative agencies is governed by Rule 18. 
When these rules provide for a motion or application to be 
made in a trial court or an administrative agency, commission, 
or board, the procedure for making such motion or application 
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice of the 
trial court, administrative agency, commission, or board. 
(b) Reference to "court."'Except as provided in Rule 43, when 
these rules refer to a decision or action by the court, the 
reference shall include a panel of the court. The term "trial 
court" means the court or administrative agency, commission, 
or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate 
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is pro-
vided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an order of 
an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the 
state which is inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the 
s ta tute shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall apply 
to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be 
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court or Court of Appeals as established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P. 
(f) Rules for appeals in child welfare proceedings. Appeals 
taken from juvenile court orders related to abuse, neglect, 
dependency, termination, and adoption proceedings are gov-
erned by Title VIII, Rules 52 through 59, except for orders 
related to substantiation proceedings under Section 78-3a-
320. Rules 9, 10 and 23B do not apply, but the other appellate 
rules apply if not inconsistent with Rules 52 through 59. 
Rule 2. Suspens ion of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, 
on its own motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, 
except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), 48, 52, 
and 59, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these 
rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that 
case in accordance with its direction. 
TITLE H. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND 
ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: h o w taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which j 
an appeal is permitted as a mat ter of right from the trial court j 
to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 ^ 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days | | 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from, j 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 1 
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal j 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial i j 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
923 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 5 
court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by 
any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or 
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. Similarly, if a timely motion is filed in the trial court 
(1) for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; or (2) to withdraw a plea under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the 
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying 
the motion to withdraw the plea. A notice of appeal filed before 
the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. 
Anew notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court 
disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as 
provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed 
after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but 
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court 
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is 
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal 
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by 
paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of 
the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of 
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in 
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No 
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 
days from the date of entry of the order grant ing the motion, 
whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an 
inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in 
either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is 
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be 
shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting 
forth the date of deposit and stating tha t first-class postage 
has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner 
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives 
the first notice of appeal. 
Rule 5. Discret ionary appeals from interlocutory or-
ders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be sought by any par ty by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order 
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial 
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A 
timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, tha t the appellate court determines 
is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be 
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission 
to appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may 
direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to 
the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition, 
together with the fee required by statute. For a petition 
presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of 
the petition, together with the fee required by statute. The 
petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and 
notice of the filing of the petition on the trial court. If an order 
is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the 
respective parties and shall t ransmit a certified copy of the 
order, together with a copy of the petition, to the trial court 
where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of 
appeal. 
(c) Content of petition. 
(c)(1) The petition shall contain: 
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consid-
eration of the issue presented and the order sought to be 
reviewed; 
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail, and 
a demonstration that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard of appel-
late review and cite supporting authority; 
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate 
interlocutory appeal should be permitted, including a concise 
analysis of the statutes, rules or cases believed to be determi-
native of the issue stated; and 
(c)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may 
materially advance the termination of the litigation. 
(c)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme 
Court to the Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assign-
ment to the Court of Appeals" shall appear immediately under 
the title of the document, i.e. Petition for Permission to 
Appeal. Appellant may then set forth in the petition a concise 
statement why the Supreme Court should decide the case in 
light of the relevant factors listed in Rule 9(c)(7). 
(c)(3) The petitioner shall at tach a copy of the order of the 
trial court from which an appeal is sought and any related 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and opinion. 
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any 
other party may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. If 
the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to 
the Court of Appeals, the answer may contain a concise 
response to the petitioner's contentions under Rule 5(c). An 
original and five copies of the answer shall be filed in the 
Supreme Court. An original and four copies shall be filed in 
the Court of Appeals. The respondent shall serve the answer 
on the petitioner. The petition and any answer shall be 
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be granted only if it appears that the order involves 
substantial rights and may materially affect the final decision 
or that a determination of the correctness of the order before 
final judgment will better serve the administration and inter-
ests of justice. The order permitting the appea lmay set forth 
the particular issue or point of law which will be considered 
and may be on such terms, including the filing of a bond for 
costs and damages, as the appellate court may determine. The 
clerk of the appellate court shall immediately give the parties 
and trial court notice by mail of any order granting or denying 
the petition. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be 
deemed to have been filed and docketed by the granting of the 
petition. All proceedings subsequent to the granting of the 
petition shall be as, and within the time required, for appeals 
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Restatement of the Law — Torts 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Current through June 2005 
Copyright © 1965-2006 by the American Law Institute 
Division 2. Negligence 
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land 
Topic 5. Liability Of Possessors To Persons Outside Of The Land 
Title A. Liability For Condition Of Land And Structures Thereon 
§ 368. Conditions Dangerous To Travelers On Adjacent Highway 
Link to Case Citations 
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation or other artificial condition 
so near an existing highway that he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others 
accidentally brought into contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the highway, 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who 
(a) are traveling on the highway, or 
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel. 
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REST 2d TORTS § 343 Page 1 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965) 
(Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
Restatement of the Law — Torts 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Current through June 2005 
Copyright © 1965-2006 by the American Law Institute 
Division 2. Negligence 
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land 
Topic 1. Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Persons On The Land 
Title E. Special Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Invitees 
§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known To Or Discoverable By Possessor 
Link to Case Citations 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the 
land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that 
it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves 
against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
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REST 2d TORTS § 343A Page 1 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965) 
(Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
Restatement of the Law — Torts 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Current through June 2005 
Copyright © 1965-2006 by the American Law Institute 
Division 2. Negligence 
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land 
Topic 1. Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Persons On The Land 
Title E. Special Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Invitees 
§ 343A. Known Or Obvious Dangers 
Link to Case Citations 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or 
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the 
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the 
fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of 
importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated. 
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9. Ms. Phitsnoukanh testified that she knew there was a sidewalk running along 
Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would typically look for pedestrians: 
Q. Okay. Now, you had indicated that you did know that a sidewalk 
ran across — ran along this street; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you ever seen pedestrians walking there before? 
A. Most of the time I went, no. But I always pull up and look 
and have never seen anybody walking past there. 
A. It's a sidewalk. I expect to see people to walk on there, to see 
people walk there. I mean, you never know when people are 
going to show up on that sidewalk at a certain time. 
(Phitsnoukanh Depo. at 19:6-14; 25:1-4). 
10. Ms. Phitsnoukanh testified that she was going "less than ten [miles per hour] and 
more than five [miles per hour]" and stated that the reason she knows this is because there was a 
"blind side": 
A. Yes, because I try not to go very fast on there because I know 
that's a blind side 
Q. How do you know that it's a blind side? 
A. Because sometimes it's difficult to see when anybody is 
coming, and I want to make sure that I see it. 
(Phitsnoukanh Depo. at 24:9-19). 
11. Ms. Phitsnoukanh testified that she would typically stop at a sidewalk even if there 
was not a stop sign: 
Q. Now, even if the stop sign wasn't there or if you did not see that, 
are you aware of any law that requires you to stop — or law or rule 
that requires you to stop at a sidewalk before proceeding out into the 
road? 
A. The law for me? 
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Plaintiff denies these allegations by the Defendant. Dr. Gomer does indeed opine that 
had Bank of Utah used a mirror devise, improved signage leading to a loud alerting signal for 
pedestrians and bicyclists, as they approached the blind intersection, and better warning 
information, the collision likely would not have occurred. See Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer, 
filed contemporaneously herewith as Exhibit 2. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c)(3)(B), Plaintiff also sets forth the following additional 
undisputed facts showing that Bank of Utah did in fact owe Plaintiff a duty of care. 
1. Cameron was traveling at a reasonable speed on the sidewalk at the date and time 
of the collision, approximately 3-4 m.p.h., and in a matter that did not pose a threat to any other 
pedestrians or travelers upon the sidewalk. (Deposition of Cameron Smith, p. 21:13-23. True 
and correct copies of cited provisions from Cameron's deposition are annexed hereto as Exhibit 
3.) Cameron slowed down as he approached the "blind corner" in order to better see any 
possibly approaching vehicle. (See Answer to Interrogatory No. 20, Ex. 1.) Cameron did not 
see the vehicle until it was too late for him to stop or otherwise avoid the collision. (Id.) 
2. In his investigation report regarding the collision on March 31, 2003, Officer 
Peterson described the accident as follows: "As [Defendant Phitsnoukanh] approached (sic) the 
sidewalk, [Defendant Phitsnoukanh's] view to her right was blocked by the building of 2627 
Washington Blvd. [Defendant Phitsnoukanh] did not see the bicyclist until the last second and 
was unable to stop prior to hitting the left side of the rider." A true and correct copy of Officer 
Peterson's accident report is annexed hereto as Exhibit 4. 
3. Box number 29, on the right side of the police report, contains the code u06", 
which according to Officer Peterson indicated "a driver's vision obscured and that is a building 
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obscured the driver's vision." (Peterson Depo. at p. 38:13-15, a true and correct copy of which is 
annexed hereto as Exhibit 5.) 
4. Defendant Bank of Utah owns the property situated at 2605 Washington 
Boulevard. 
5. There are no warnings posted anywhere on the sidewalk to warn pedestrians or 
others traveling on the sidewalk of exiting vehicles, or the potential that vehicles may enter into 
the sidewalk area without advance warning. (See Ex. 2, annexed photographs designated 
Exhibits B and C.) 
6. Some patrons exiting through the Bank of Utah's drive through did not stop prior 
to entering into and crossing the sidewalk. A DVD-disc containing footage of Bank of Utah 
patrons exiting the bank is annexed hereto as Exhibit 6. 
7. Even if a patron stopped at the stop sign placed near the end of Bank of Utah's 
exit, that patron still could not see on-coming pedestrian traffic to the south, because of the 
building directly to the south that limited a driver's field of view. (See Ex. 2, U 11.) 
8. In order for an exiting vehicle to see pedestrian traffic to the south, the vehicle 
must first enter into the sidewalk area to see beyond the building obstructing the driver's vision. 
(Ex. 2, annexed photographs designated Exhibits B and C; Ex. 6.) 
9. Implementation of simple measures, such as placement of a mirror enabling 
exiting vehicles to see around the blind corner, as well as permitting pedestrians and other 
approaching from the south to see approaching vehicles, placing warning signage and other 
indicators to pedestrians approaching from the south, and otherwise warning exiting drivers of 
the potential presence of pedestrians would have significantly reduced the likelihood of this 
accident occurring. (Ex. 2, at Y& 27-29.) 
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of 
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
795 East 24th Street 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-1384 
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and 
BANK OF UTAH, Inc. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DR. FRANK E. GOMER 
Civil No: 030906813 
Judge: Parley R. Baldwin 
STATE OF ARIZONA ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF MARICOPA ) 
I, Dr. Frank E. Gomer, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am a citizen of the United States, a resident of Scottsdale City, Maricopa 
County, State of Arizona, and am over the age of eighteen years of age, and am in all 
respects competent to make this affidavit. I have personal knowledge regarding all of the 
matters stated herein, and would so testify at any hearing on the matter in the above-
styled action. 
2. The expert opinions and conclusions contained in this affidavit are 
presented with a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, based, in part, upon 
my review and analysis of: 
a. The Complaint filed by the Plaintiff. 
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b. Plaintiffs Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories 
and Plaintiffs Responses to the First and Second Requests for 
Production of Documents. 
c. Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. 
d. The Original Accident Report, prepared by Officer Peterson. 
e. The expert report based on a reconstruction of the accident 
scene, prepared for the Defendant Bank of Utah, Inc. by 
Ronald Probert. 
f. Deposition transcripts, with exhibits, for the Plaintiff, Cameron 
Smith, and for T. Phitsnoukamnh and B. Peterson. 
g. Copies of 16 color photographs taken by Defense counsel, with 
the assistance of Officer Peterson, about 8 months after the 
accident. 
h. Authoritative regulations, documents, and texts addressing: (a) 
the operation of a bicycle on a sidewalk, in the state of Utah 
(Utah Code - Title 41, Chapter 6); (b) the absence of any 
ordnance issued by the City of Ogden prohibiting the operation 
of a bicycle on a sidewalk; and (c) the known hazardous 
condition, created when an exit roadway intersects a sidewalk 
and one or both of the corners of that intersection are occupied 
by buildings, which obscure visibility around the corner. 
3. The expert opinions and conclusions presented herein also are based upon: 
a. A site visit to the scene of the accident, which I conducted on 
March 15, 2004. 
b. My education, training, and professional experience in human 
factors engineering and safety engineering; in forensic 
assessments and reconstructions of personal injury accidents; 
and in accident prevention methods. 
4. I received my doctorate degree in Human Factors and Psychology 
from Washington University in St. Louis. A true and correct copy of my 
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curriculum vitae is appended to my affidavit as Exhibit A, and incorporated 
herein by this reference as though set forth fully and at length. 
5. I am a professional member of the American Society of Safety 
Engineers, the Human Factors Engineering and Ergonomic Society, and the 
Safety Standards Technical Panel for Underwriters Laboratories. 
6. I also conducted safety audits at nuclear power plants across the 
country, during which I specifically addressed safety hazards associated with 
"blind corners." 
7. Human factors engineering is the engineering discipline focused on 
optimizing the design of equipment systems and premises to ensure safe and 
efficient use by humans. 
8. This engineering discipline applies a detailed understanding of 
human capabilities, limitations, expectations, and preferences to the engineering 
design process. 
9. Safety engineering is a complementary engineering discipline, 
focused on identification and evaluation of hazardous equipment system and 
premises conditions and on the implementation of effective hazard control 
methods. 
10. I reviewed the hereinbefore-described information associated with 
this traffic accident to determine whether the blind intersection of a sidewalk and 
an exit roadway from the drive-thru area of the bank was hazardous, and whether 
there were simple, yet effective controls that could have been implemented by the 
bank to eliminate or substantially reduce the likelihood of a collision. 
11. During my review of the accident scene and associated 
photographs, I observed the general condition of the area in question. A true and 
correct copy of the digital color photograph taken during the site visit and 
inspection I conducted is appended to this affidavit as Exhibit B, and incorporated 
herein by this reference. Exhibit B shows the exit roadway from the bank and the 
sidewalk in front of the "STOP" sign. The view is to the east, toward Washington 
Boulevard. The building to the right of the exit roadway obstructs the vision of 
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any driver attempting to look to the south, the direction from which Cameron 
Smith was bicycling. 
12. A true and correct copy of another digital color photograph taken 
during my site visit and inspection is appended hereto as Exhibit C, and 
incorporated herein by this reference. Exhibit C shows the exit roadway from the 
bank and the sidewalk, but the view is toward the northwest. The automobile in 
the photograph is exiting onto Washington Boulevard. The sign in the median' 
strip between the bank's entrance and exit roadways is directly behind the 
"STOP" sign shown in Exhibit B. The location of the stop sign is several feet to 
the west of the sidewalk. 
13. The Bank of Utah premises, which are the subject of this litigation, 
are located at 2605 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah. Exhibits B and C show the 
exit roadway from the drive-thru area of the bank and the sidewalk on which the 
collision occurred. The accident occurred on March 31, 2003, at about 5:30pm, 
as Cameron Smith was bicycling north on the sidewalk, to the west of 
Washington Boulevard. 
14. Mr. Smith had ridden his Trek bicycle on this sidewalk about 3 or 
4 times prior to the accident. (Interrogatory No. 23, Answers to First Set of 
Interrogatories to Plaintiff, a true and correct copy of which is annexed hereto as 
Exhibit D.) He stated that he was riding on this sidewalk because of safety 
concerns, since Washington Boulevard is a very busy street. (Interrogatory No. 
24, Exhibit D.) 
15. The driver of the vehicle that struck Mr. Smith on the sidewalk 
was exiting the drive-thru area of the bank on the roadway shown in Exhibit B. 
She stated in her deposition that, even though she believed she came to a stop 
before reaching the "STOP" sign, to look in both directions, she did not see Mr. 
Smith until after she struck him with her vehicle. (Tanisha Phitsnoukanh 
deposition, at pp. 23:1-24, 32:20-25. True and correct copies from Ms. 
Phitsnoukanh's deposition are annexed hereto as Exhibit E.) 
16. Mr. Smith stated he was traveling slowly, at 3 to 4 mph, when he 
saw the vehicle, suddenly and without warning, driving through the exit roadway 
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onto the sidewalk. (Cameron Smith deposition, at pp. 21:13-23, True and correct 
copies of cited excerpts from Mr. Smith's deposition are annexed hereto as 
Exhibit F.) He tried to swerve to the right but he was unable to avoid being struck 
by the vehicle, and he was carried forward toward Washington Boulevard. 
(Exhibit F, at p. 22:12-20.) The bicycle was partially pinned underneath the front 
of the vehicle. ((Exhibit F., at p. 29:1-10.) 
17. The police report was prepared by the responding officer, Brian 
Peterson, on the day of the accident. (A true and correct copy of Officer 
Peterson's report is annexed hereto as Exhibit G.) The report states that the 
driver's view to the right (i.e., toward Mr. Smith before he was struck) was 
blocked by the building shown in Exhibit B. 
18. There are no detailed accident scene diagrams and no photographs 
included with the report. (See Exhibit G.) In addition there is no indication that 
any braking-related skid marks, either produced by the vehicle or produced by the 
bicycle, were visible at the scene, or that Mr. Smith was traveling too quickly on 
the sidewalk when he was struck. (See id.) 
19. Mr. Smith was asked in his deposition and stated he was not 
traveling fast enough to leave any braking-related skid marks on the sidewalk. 
(Exhibit F, at pp. 24:24-25:8.) 
20. Officer Peterson estimated the point-of-impact to be 13 feet 8 
inches west of Washington Blvd. (Exhibit G.) From the measurements I took 
during my site visit, the distance from the west edge of the sidewalk, directly in 
front of the exit roadway from the bank, to the east edge of the sidewalk, adjacent 
to Washington Blvd., is approximately 24 feet 8 inches. The vehicle extended 
about 11 feet onto the sidewalk when it struck Mr. Smith. 
21. Mr. Probert, an accident reconstructionist retained by Bank of Utah 
to analyze the scene of the accident, opined that Mr. Smith, although having the 
right-of-way, as opposed to the driver of the vehicle, should have been more 
aware of the hazardous situation created by the blind intersection and should have 
"done more" to stop or swerve to "...allow a vehicle to lawfully proceed across a 
sidewalk." (A true and correct copy of Mr. Probert's opinion is annexed hereto as 
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Exhibit H.) Based upon my review of the accident scene, I do not believe that Mr. 
Smith would have been able to see an approaching vehicle in enough time to 
avoid the collision, because of the limited field of view resulting from the 
obstructing building. 
22. Finally, Mr. Probert concluded that Mr. Smith had violated Utah 
Code - Title 41, Chapter 6, by operating his bicycle on a sidewalk. 
23. Utah Code -Title 41, Chapter 6-87.3 specifically permits bicycles 
to be operated on sidewalks, and it does not state that a bicycle must travel in only 
one direction on the sidewalk. Further it states that a person operating a bicycle 
on a sidewalk shall have all the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian under 
the same circumstances. 
24. There is no City of Ogden ordinance prohibiting the operation of a 
bicycle on a sidewalk or restricting its direction of travel. 
25. The only part of Mr. Probert's report that has any value at all, in 
terms of understanding why this accident occurred, is his correct assertion that a 
hazardous situation is created whenever visibility around a corner of an 
intersection is obscured by a building (see G. Marshall (2000), Safety 
Engineering, Third Edition, American Society of Safety Engineers Press, Des 
Plaines, IL, Page 155). (A true and correct copy of portions of the text regarding 
intersections obstructed by buildings is annexed hereto as Exhibit I.) Marshall 
notes that the best solution is to remove the obstruction, but when that is not 
possible, the use of a convex or hemispherical mirror dramatically improves 
visibility around a corner. The use of mirrors also is recommended by the 
National Safety Council (see P. Hagan, J. Montgomery, and J. O'Reilly (2001), 
Accident Prevention Manual for Business and Industry: Engineering and 
Technology, Twelfth Edition, National Safety Council Press, Itasca, IL, page 27). 
( A true and correct copy of relevant portions of this text is annexed hereto as 
Exhibit J.) 
26. However these authors note that better signage and warnings 
should be applied as well. For example, "SOUND YOUR HORN" signs are 
necessary at all blind corners where the view of drivers is obstructed, as are 
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"WATCH FOR ON-COMING VEHICLES" signs for pedestrians and bicyclists 
on the sidewalk. (Exhibit J) 
27. In this case, the "STOP" sign shown in Exhibit B should have 
warned drivers of pedestrian traffic at this intersection. (Exhibit D) The use of: 
a. a mirror device; 
b. improved signage leading to a loud alerting signal for 
pedestrians and bicyclists, as they approach the blind 
intersection; and 
c. better warning information provided to exiting drivers 
are simple, yet effective controls that could have been implemented by the bank to 
eliminate or substantially reduce the likelihood of a collision, by warning exiting 
drivers and/or approaching pedestrians of possible danger. 
28. It is my opinion that the use of any of these methods, and ideally 
the use of all three in combination, within a reasonable degree of scientific 
probability, would have substantially reduced the likelihood of this type of 
accident occurring, 
28. In my opinion, but for the lack of implementation of these simple safety 
precautions, Mr, Smith would not have suffered his serious injury and either Ms. 
Phitsnoukamnh or Mr. Smith, or even both, would have been aware of the impending 
danger and avoided the accident. 
29. It is my opinion, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that 
Mr. Cameron Smith was seriously injured because the bank failed to implement simple, 
yet effective controls to eliminate or substantially reduce the likelihood of a collision 
caused by a known hazardous situation. 
DATED this JO day of June 2005. 
DR. FRANK E. GOMER 
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Figure 1. This digital color photograph, taken during the site visit and inspection I 
conducted, shows the exit roadway from the bank and the sidewalk in front of the 
"STOP" sign. The view is to the east, toward Washington Blvd. Note that the 
building to the right of the exit roadway obstructs the vision of any driver 
attempting to look to the south, the direction from which Cameron Smith was 
bicycling. 
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Figure 2. This digital color photograph, taken during the site visit and inspection I 
conducted, also shows the exit roadway from the bank and the sidewalk, but the 
view is toward the northwest The automobile in the photograph is exiting onto 
Washington Blvd. The sign in the median strip, between the bank's entrance and 
exit roadways, is directly behind the "STOP" sign shown in Figure L Note that the 
location of the stop sign is several feet to the west of the sidewalk. 
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1. Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 
Memorandum dated May 17, 2005; Plaintiffs Opposition thereto dated June 10, 2005; and 
Defendant Bank of Utah's Reply Memorandum in Support dated June 24, 2005. 
2. Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer 
dated June 24, 2005; Plaintiffs P.esponse thereto dated July 1, 2005; and Defendant Bank of 
Utah's Reply Memorandum in Support dated July 7, 2005. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and heard the arguments from counsel for both 
parties makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicyclist collision on or 
about March 31, 2003 at approximately 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. 
2. Defendant Tanisha Phitsnoukanh was exiting from the teller drive-thru owned by 
defendant Bank of Utah, and failed to stop or slow down as she went across the sidewalk and 
struck the plaintiff on his bicycle. 
4. Defendant Phitsnoukanh had used the teller exit at least once a month over the 
course of a year before the March 31, 2003 collision. 
5. Defendant Phitsnoukanh testified that before the collision she knew there was a 
sidewalk running along Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would 
typically stop to look for pedestrians. 
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6. Plaintiff Cameron Smith had rode a bicycle along the sidewalk where the collision 
occurred approximately three or four times prior to the March 31, 2003 collision. 
7. As plaintiff Cameron Smith approached the teller exit, he slowed his bicycle to 
gauge traffic and to watch for approaching vehicles. 
8. Plaintiff Cameron Smith testified that defendant Phitsnoukanh was coming very 
quickly looking down and that she did not stop at the stop sign or the sidewalk. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The determination of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a 
question of law to be determined by the Court. See Lamarr v. Utah State Dep 7 ofTransp., 828 
P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield the right of way to plaintiff Cameron 
Smith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 and §41-6-100. 
3. Plaintiff Cameron Smith had a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a 
reasonable speed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3. 
4. The legislature has not imposed a statutory duty on a landowner such as defendant 
Bank of Utah to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk. 
5. Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect 
pdestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk. 
6. Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff Cameron Smith as 
a matter of law. 
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7. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to defendant Bank of Utah's 
lack of duty to plaintiff Cameron Smith in this case and therefore, defendant Bank of Utah is 
entitled to summary judgment. 
Therefore, the Coun hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer is 
DENIED. 
2. Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and 
plaintiffs case is therefore, dismissed with prejudice. 
Each party to bear their own costs. 
MADE AND ENTERED this U day of (^£$JP , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE HONORABLFPARLEY R. BALI 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J. PAUL STTpCKDALE &, ASSOCIATES 
J. Paul Sfockdale 
Attorneysvfor Plaintiff 
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of 
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
795 East 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-1384 
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387 
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SECOH0 DISTRICTCOURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CAMERON SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and 
BANK OF UTAH, Inc. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No: 030906813 
Judge: Parley R. Baldwin 
Notice is hereby given that and appellant, Cameron Smith, through counsel, J. 
Paul Stockdale, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin entered in this matter on August 4, 2005. 
Plaintiff appeals the granting of the Motion for Summery Judgment in that we 
believe there is an issue of material fact and Plaintiff Cameron Smith is owed a duty. 
. ^ A 
jdkdale 
ix the Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
VD18636019 
030906813 PHITSNOUKANH,PHOUNSABATH 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was mailed via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the ff^day 
of September 2005, as follows: 
Nathan Morris 
Attorney for Defendant Bank of Utah 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Utah Court of Appeals 
P.O. Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Susan Anderson/Legal Assistant 
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030906813 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Fran Burke, certify that on the 13NDday of September, 2005 that I sent a 
certified copy of the notice of filing of NOTICE OF APPEAL, to the 
Appellate Court. 
Fran Burke, Clerk 
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of 
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C. 
795 East 24th Street 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-1384 
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387 
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SECOND DISTRICT COUtfi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CAMERON SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and 
BANK OF UTAH, Inc. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
L0CI 1 1 200S 
APPELLANT'S DOCKETING 
STATEMENT 
Civil No: 030906813 
Appellate Court No. 20050797-CA 
COMES NOW, the Appellant, Cameron Smith, by and through his attorney of 
record, J. Paul Stockdale, and hereby submits the following Docketing Statement: 
1. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT: The appellant is appealing from 
the Order of the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah dated September 6, 2005 
granting summary judgment. 
2. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: The Notice of Appeal was 
properly filed on September 9, 2005. 
3. JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Court 
of Appeals of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(a) because there is an appeal from a 
final order of decree disposing of the case. 
4. NATURE OF THE POST JUDGMENT MOTION AND DATE FILED: 
There have been no post judgment motions filed. 
Appellants Docketing Statement 
n o 
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5. DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDER DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT 
MOTION AND ORDER OF DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT MOTION AND 
ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT: There was no order 
disposing of post judgment motions. Final judgment was entered on September 6,2005. 
6. CLAIM FOR DAMAGE: We believe the damages to be approaching one 
million dollars. 
7. The Appellant appeals the District Court finding wherein the Defendant 
Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a 
public sidewalk and Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff 
Cameron Smith as a matter of law. These duties Plaintiff believes exist revolve around 
the design and construction of a drive thru teller wherein the Bank of Utah patrons would 
use the drive thru to conduct banking activities then when leaving the Bank of Utah 
parking lot cross a sidewalk before stopping at Washington Blvd. to make a turn onto the 
street. The cars cannot see pedestrians approaching and most do not stop at the sidewalk 
but instead drive dangerously fast through the sidewalk and stop only when they reach 
the street. The District Court did not believe the Bank of Utah owed any duty to the 
Plaintiff herein. 
A. The Appellant knows of no claim or parties remaining before the 
trial court for adjudication. 
B. The Appellant states that the facts underlying this Appeal are not 
sufficiently similar to the facts underlying any claims remaining before the trial court and 
would not constitute res judicata or other claims. 
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8. NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY: This Appeal is from an Order 
Granting Summary Judgment by the Second District Court for Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
9. STATEMENT OF FACTS: The Appellant was riding his bicycle on 
March 31, 2003, on the sidewalk abutting Washington Boulevard. Appellant was 
traveling north on that sidewalk and crossed an exit from the Bank of Utah where he was 
struck by an exiting vehicle. The Bank of Utah constructed or caused to be constructed an 
outdoor teller and channeled patrons out an exit and onto Washington Blvd. The patrons 
crossed the sidewalk before entering Washington Blvd. The design of this exit made it 
impossible for patrons to see pedestrian or cyclists coming down the sidewalk. Bank of 
Utah knew or should have known that the drive-thru presented a blind entry onto the 
sidewalk where both pedestrians and bicycles travel frequently. In order for an exiting 
vehicle to see pedestrian traffic to the south, the vehicle must first enter into the sidewalk 
area to see beyond the building obstructing the driver's vision. Bank of Utah prior to the 
collision took no simple measures, such as placement of a mirror enabling exiting 
vehicles to see around the blind corner, as well as permitting pedestrians and others 
approaching from the south to see approaching vehicles. Bank of Utah placed no 
warning signage and other indicators to pedestrians approaching from the south or 
otherwise warning exiting drivers of the potential presence of pedestrians. Arrows were 
painted on the pavement of the drive-thru directing the patrons toward the exit area and 
onto the sidewalk. Only the arrows were painted on the pavement no stop sign or caution 
signs were painted on the pavement area to catch the attention of patrons using the drive-
thru and warning them of an impending duty to stop for any potentially dangerous 
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situation ahead. Appellant contends that the Defendant Bank of Utah owes a common 
law duty to construct the ingress and egress to it's drive thru teller window in such a 
manor as to protect the public traversing the sidewalk from the increased traffic flow 
created by the Bank of Utah. A settlement was reached with Phounsavath 
Paitsnoukanhand and she has been released from this case 
10. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A. Did the Court err in finding that the Appellee owed no common law duty 
to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk; and 
B. Did the Court err in finding that the Appellee did not owe a duty of care to 
Appellant Cameron Smith as a matter of law? 
STANDARD REVIEW 
A. This presents questions of law. This Court reviews questions of law for 
correctness. See Jorgensen's Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872 (Utah App. Ct. 
2001). Schulz v. Quinntana, 576 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1978). 
11. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §368 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§343 and 343A. 
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,\8, 2005 WL 831747 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, §343). 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah App. 1992). 
Little v. UtahDiv. Of Family Serv., 667 P.2d 49 
Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, f 15,67 P.3d 1017 (quoting Williams v. Melby, 699 
P.2d723, 728 (Utah 1985)). 
Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 272, 159 P.2d 149 (1945). 
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Schuh v. Quinntana, 576P.2d855, 856 (Utah 1978). 
Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 IlUd 42, 566 N.E.2d 1365 (1991), 
Ziemba, 142111.2dat 50, 566 N.E.2dat 1368 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-19(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 
The Appellant knows of no reason why this case should not remain before the 
Court of Appeals. 
12. RELATED APPEALS: There are no related or prior appeals. 
13. ATTACHMENTS: Attached to this Docketing Statements are: 
a. The Court's Findings and final Order of the Court. 
b. The Notice of Appeal. 
DATED this Le ^c lay of October 2005. 
J. Paul Stockdale 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the original and two copies of foregoing APPELLANT'S 
DOCKETING STATEMENT was mailed via United States Mail, first class postage 
prepaid to the Utah Court of Appeals and one copy to Nathan Morris on {f* day 
of October 2005, as follows: 
Nathan Morris 
Key Bank tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Utah Court of Appeals 
P.O. Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
/-', 
V ;'V^^^"<^ '' C2**-C±^&r 
Susan Anderson 
Legal Assistant 
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S. BAJRD MORGAN [2314] 
NATHANS. MORRIS [9431] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Bank of Utah, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




PHOUNSABATH PHITSNOUKANH and 
BANK OF UTAH, INC., 
Defendants. 
SIP C 6 2005 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
BANK OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030906813 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
Plaintiff Cameron Smith, by and through counsel of record J. Paul Stockdale, and 
defendant Bank of Utah, by and through counsel of record Nathan S. Morris of Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson, appeared before the Court on August 4, 2005 to argue the following motions: 
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in 1. Defendant Bank of Utah 's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 
Memorandum dated May 17, 2005; Plaintiffs Opposition thereto dated June 10, 2005; and 
Defendant Bank of Utah's Reply Memorandum in Support dated June 24, 2005. 
2. Defendant Bank of Utah ' s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer 
dated June 24, 2005; Plaintiffs Response thereto dated July 1, 2005; and Defendant Bank of 
Utah 's Reply Memorandum in Support dated July 7, 2005. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and heard the arguments from counsel for both 
parties makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicyclist collision on or 
about March 31, 2003 at approximately 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. 
2. Defendant Tanisha Phitsnoukanh was exiting from the teller drive-thru owned by 
defendant Bank of Utah, and failed to stop or slow down as she went across the sidewalk and 
struck the plaintiff on his bicycle. 
4. Defendant Phitsnoukanh had used the teller exit at least once a month over the 
course of a year before the March 31, 2003 collision. 
5. Defendant Phitsnoukanh testified that before the collision she knew there was a 
sidewalk running along Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would 
typically stop to look for pedestrians. 
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ir> 6. Plaintiff Cameron Smith had rode a bicycle along the sidewalk where the collision 
\ 
occurred approximately three or four times prior to the March 31, 2003 collision. 
7. As plaintiff Cameron Smith approached the teller exit, he slowed his bicycle to 
gauge traffic and to watch for approaching vehicles. 
8. . Plaintiff Cameron Smith testified that defendant Phitsnoukanh was coming very 
quickly looking down and that she did not stop at the stop sign or the sidewalk. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The determination of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a 
question of law to be determined by the Court. See Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828 
P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield the right of way to plaintiff Cameron 
Smith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 and §41-6-100. 
3. Plaintiff Cameron Smith had a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a 
reasonable speed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3. 
4. The legislature has not imposed a statutory duty on a landowner such as defendant 
Bank of Utah to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk. 
5. Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect 
pdestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk. 
6. Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff Cameron Smith as 
a matter of law. 
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w 7. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to defendant Bank of Utah's \ 
lack of duty to plaintiff Cameron Smith in this case and therefore, defendant Bank of Utah is 
entitled to summary judgment. 
Therefore, the Coun hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer is 
DENIED. 
2. Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and 
plaintiffs case is therefore, dismissed with prejudice. 
Each party to bear their own costs. 
U day of MADE AND ENTERED this ^ _ day of P^C^J , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J. PAUL Sft)CKDALE & ASSC 
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of 
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
795 East 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401' 
Telephone: (801) 621-1384 
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387 
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SEP 1 3 2005 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CAMERON SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and 
BANK OF UTAH, Inc. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No: 030906813 
Judge: Parley R. Baldwin 
Notice is hereby given that and appellant, Cameron Smith, through counsel, J. 
Paul Stockdale, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin entered in this matter on August 4, 2005. 
Plaintiff appeals the granting of the Motion for Summery Judgment in that we 
believe there is an issue of material fact and Plaintiff Cameron Smith is owed a duty. 
ikdale 
it the Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was mailed via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the J ^ f day 
of September 2005, as follows: 
Nathan Morris 
Attorney for Defendant Bank of Utah 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Utah Court of Appeals 
P.O. Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Susan Anderson/Legal Assistant 
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